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ABSTRACT
This paper consists of an analysis of the problems
pertaining to the interdiction of a land logistic net-
work. Leontieff-type input-output models are employed
to describe the flows of materiel in the logistic system.
The objective of interdiction is regarded to be the reduc-
tion of exogenous demands required of the system. These
demands are represented in the models. Consideration is
given to the alternatives of interdicting the flows of
materiel through the depots, the materiel in the stockpiles
at the depots, the flows of materiel between depots, and of
interdicting the handling facilities and capacities of the
depots, the stockpiles, and the logistic routes. The
paper contains a discussion of the use of analog computers
and associated plotting equipment for the solution of the
systems of differential eauations involved in the models.
The author points out the utility of these computers to





Advances in airpower have increased the scope and
importance of the interdiction of enemy logistic routes,
depots, and stockpiles in the military commander's concept
of operations, and conceivably, the role of interdiction
may become commensurately more important with advances in
guided missiles. It is in regard to these prospects that
this paper is concerned with the development of a tech-
nique which will be useful in planning interdictory campaigns
The primary problem considered in this paper is the
planning of an interdiction campaign against an enemy logis-
tic system within the enemy zone of interior and its con-
tiguous area of operations. The planning of the inter-
dictory campaign is contingent upon the mathematical models
which describe the flows of munitions and materiel in the
complex of logistic routes, depots, and stockpiles of the
zone of interior and the front. The models are essentially
the same as those developed by Wassily W. Leontieff to
study national economics. However, the models presented in
this paper are utilized to describe logistic flows and do
not involve the economic considerations of an interdictory
campaign.
The accuracy of these models in estimating the enemy's
logistical situation is dependent on the intelligence that
can be accumulated concerning the enemy logistic system and
iii

its operation. It may be anticipated that the lack of suf-
ficient intelligence will severely limit the usefulness of
these models, as well as other models, as a planning tool.
The use of large-scale analog computers has been found to
be of considerable value in manipulating the mathematical
quantities of the models, and the use of these computers
is strongly recommended.
The author emphasizes that the models developed in
the text are intended to be planning implements and do not
necessarily constitute a quantitative analysis of the
situation as the main attack progresses.
This thesis was written during the period January-
June, 1956, at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California. I wish to express my appreciation to Professor
Thomas E. Oberbeck for his technical assistance and whole-
hearted interest in the thesis, to Professor J. Giarrantana,
who offered many helpful suggestions as second reader, and
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(Listed as the symbol appears in the text)
t The time at which the enemy logistic system is
taken under study.
t-i The time at which the attacking commander
launches an attack in the area of operations.
m The number of depots in the enemy's logistic
system.
i A particular depot of the m depots in the system,
i = 1 , 2 , - - - , m.
X i (t) The flow of materiel through the i
th depot at
any time, t, measured in cargo-tons per month.
Sj The flow of materiel to or from the stockpile
at the i^n depot at any time, t, measured in
cargo-tons per month.
xki (k4=i) The flow of materiel that is sent from the i
th
depot to the kth depot at any time, t, measured
in cargo-tons per month.
a^i A proportionality constant associated with a
logistic route.
•
X^(t) The time rate of change of the flow of materiel
through the i^n depot at any time, t, measured
in cargo-tons per month squared.
b^ A proportionality constant associated with a
stockpile flow measured in units of time, t.
S^(t) The size of the stockpile at the i^n depot at
any time, t, measured in cargo-tons of materiel.
S? The size of the stockpile at the itn depot at
time t Q , measured in cargo-tons of materiel.
X j_ The flow of materiel through the itn depot at
time t
,
measured in cargo-tons per month.
X^ The maximum flow of materiel through the i Gn
depot that is possible. This ouantity is limited
in magnitude by the capacity of the handling












The maximum size of the stockpile at the i
depot, measured in cargo-tons, that can be
accumulated because of stowage facilities.
th
The maximum flow of materiel that can be sent
from the itn depot to the k^h depot, measured in
cargo-tons per month.
This quantity is limited by the handling
capacity of the one-way logistic route from the
ith depot to the ktn depot.






































The demand function for the ith depot. The flow
of materiel to the forces in the field, measured
in cargo-tons per month, at the i^h depot.
ix

(X . The value of the demand function at time t^«
mn i The slope of the linear portion of the curve
shown in Figure 3(b).
/& n j_ The exponential exponent of the curve shown in
Figure 3(c).




xn^ The reduced value of the demand function at the
itn depot, which will result from interdiction.
Pn i A fractional constant associated with the
reduced value of the demand function. s Pn^<l.
Rni The amount by which the demand function at the
itn depot is reduced, i.e., x*^ - xn ^ - Rn^
.
R[x i (t)J The amount by which the flow through ith depot
is reduced with time.
X?(t) The reduced flow of materiel through the ith
depot, at any time t measured in cargo-tons
per month.
x (k=^i) The reduced flow of materiel that is sent from
** the itn depot to the ktn depot, at any time t
measured in cargo-tons per month.
S.(t) The reduced flow of materiel that is sent to or
from the stockpile at the itn depot at any time t
measured in cargo-tons per month.
X^(t) The reduced maximum flow of materiel through the
itn depot at any time t, measured in cargo-tons
per month. This reduced maximum flow is caused
by interdicting the handling facilities at the
ith depot. Xjl is defined by: X^ = 1 ± - 0i,
where 0j_ is the amount by which the maximum flow
is reduced due to interdiction.
xj
c
^(k^i) The reduced maximum flow of materiel that is sent
from the itn depot to the ktn depot at any time t
measured in cargo-tons per month. This reduced
maximum flow is caused by interdicting the one-
way logistic route facilities between the i tn

depot_and kth depot, and xk ^(k^i) is defined
by: x^i = xki -Tki» w^ere \|/^i is the amount
by which the maximum flow is reduced due to
interdiction.
Sj_(t) The reduced maximum size of the stockpile at
the itn depot at any time t, measured in cargo-
tons. This reduced maximum size of the itn
stockpile is caused by interdicting the facili-
ties and storage capacity of^that stockpile.
Silt) is defined by Silt) = 3^ - Q it where 9*
is the amount by which the maximum size of the
stockpile is reduced over time due to inter-
diction.
f ( *X ) The characteristic matrix of C, namely, f ( "X )
XI - C.
°?
F( X ) The adjoint matrix of f(X).
A ( 'X ) The characteristic function of the matrix C,
namely, A< X ) = | fCX) I .






The term "interdict" is defined in OPNAVINST 3020-1A
[l] 1 as:
"To prevent or hinder, by any means, enemy use of
an area or route."
To interdict enemy logistic routes would imply that the
enemy would be hindered in the use of his lines of supply
thereby dissociating his operating military forces from their
bases of operations. Since the enemy* s munitions and rein-
forcements flow along these logistic routes, that flow would
be restricted commensurately with the amount of damage
inflicted on his logistic routes and carriers. If the inter-
diction is continued over a period of time, the enemy*
s
operating forces may experience shortages of supplies,
munitions and reinforcements. This may be regarded as part
of the objective of an interdictory campaign against the
enemy logistic system.
Interdictory campaigns are by no means new in the mili-
tary commander's concept of operations. However, the weapons
methods utilized to attain the objective in interdictory cam-
paigns have been advanced considerably since the advent of the
long range aircraft, the submarine, and other such weapon
systems as interdictory weapons.




Historically, the siege of fortresses in ancient times
often entailed no more than an interdictory campaign. In
such a campaign the objective would be to starve the defend-
ing forces into submission by surrounding the fortress and
thereby preventing the entry of supplies and munitions to the
fortress. Eventually, stockpiles within the fortress would
dwindle and the beleaguered defenders would either have to
submit to the opposing forces or engage them in battle. Such
campaigns often did not involve a direct assault on the fort-
ress, and since time was not of great importance, the cam-
paigns would last for long periods of time.
In wars where the enemy depended primarily on sea routes
for his logistic routes, naval blockade proved to be an impor-
tant interdictory weapon. Examples of such interdictory cam-
paigns are the naval blockade of the Confederate States by
the Union forces during the Civil War, the German U-boat cam-
paigns of World Wars I and II, and the United States submarine
and mining campaigns against the Japanese in World War II.
In the Korean Action the United Nations Command interdicted
the enemy* s logistic routes and the transporting vehicles by
the use of aircraft and naval vessels. Although the aircraft
interdictory campaign conducted in Korea was somewhat more
limited in scope than would normally be expected, in general,
even extensive aircraft interdictory campaigns do not consti-
tute strategic air warfare. These campaigns usually are

component parts of strategic air warfare, but they do not
include all of the broad concepts involved in such warfare.
2. Concept of a Logistic System.
It is appropriate at this stage to define a land logistic
system in rather broad terms. A land logistic system is
envisioned as being contained in a large geographical area
constituting a zone of interior and its associated area of
operations. The system will consist of depots, either
cities or handling junctions, which are interconnected by a
complex of logistic routes over which flow the supplies and
munitions of war. Also associated with the system are the
components such as stockpiles and the carriers of cargo; the
trucks, vessels, trains, and aircraft. Obviously, this
definition of a land logistic system is limited, but it will
suffice as a qualitative description for the purposes of
this paper.
3. Scope of the Thesis.
This paper presents an elementary treatment of the inter-
diction problem in regard to an interdiction campaign against
a land logistic complex. While it is not the most sophisti-
cated treatment, it does provide the military planner with
a practical basis upon which he may build a more complicated
and comprehensive interdictory plan. The interdictory
aspects dealt with in this paper are primarily:
a. The adaptation of a simple mathematical model to
describe the aggregated supply and munitions flows in an enemy
complex of logistic depots, routes, and stockpiles.
3

b. The modification of this model to describe the
logistic flows in the enemy logistic complex when the asso-
ciated front is subjected to attack.
c. The formulation and brief discussion of the problem
confronting the attacking commander when he interdicts the
enemy's logistic system in an attempt to cause the system
to fail to supply the required ouantity of supplies and
munitions at the frontal depots.
4. The Planning Implements.
A rather broad qualitative description of a land logis-
tic system has been proposed in Section 2. To describe such
a system in detail would be a monumental task, and although
it would be possible to do so, an attempt to describe the
system quantitatively would yield a model of such complexity
that it would be virtually unusable by the attacking com-
mander. For this reason, the quantitative mathematical
models presented in this thesis deal only with those aspects
of a land logistic system which concerns the interdictory
commander, i.e., the handling facilities for the flows of
supplies and munitions in the system and the flows them-
selves in terms of the flows of materiel through the depots,
along the logistic routes, and into and out of the logistic
stockpiles. These mathematical models are proposed as the
planning implements which will assist the interdictory com-
mander in allocating his interdictory forces. Chapters II,
III and IV present the rudiments of this planning implement.
4

In particular, Chapter II deals with a model which describes
the flows of supplies and munitions in a land logistic sys-
tem when there is no attack on the system in the area of
h
operations. The model is modified in Chapter III to des-
cribe the flows in the same system when the system is sub-
jected to an attack in the area of operations. Chapter IV
formulates and discusses various facets of the interdiction
problem based on the modified model of Chapter III.
5. Summary.
The mathematical models developed in Chapters II and
III have certain limitations which limit the usefulness of
these models in describing the actual materiel flows in a
logistic system. At best, the models can describe only
approximately the actual flows of materiel in the system.
Also, the lack of intelligence concerning the enemy's logis-
tic system severely limits the usefulness of these or any
other models. In many cases, it may be necessary to esti-
mate the magnitudes of certain materiel flows when accurate
data on these flows are lacking. Although the author assumes
throughout this paper that complete information concerning
the enemy's logistic system is available to the attacking
commander, it should be realized that such cases would be
uncommon. In any case, the purpose of this paper is con-
cerned rather with the concept of the model than its accuracy
in an actual application.
5

The discussion in Chapter IV indicates the immense
magnitude of the interdiction problem which would con-
front the military planner in planning an interdiction
campaign. The interdictory aspects discussed in that chap-
ter are based on the use of the modified model of Chapter III
to describe the materiel flows in the enemy's logistic
system. Chapter V embodies a brief but important discussion
on the use of analog computers to solve some of the systems
of equations developed in the mathematical models of





1. Explanation of the Model.
A Leontieff-type model [2I is introduced in this chap-
ter to represent the flow schematic of a land logistic system,
From the time that a study of the system is undertaken, time
tQ , until a later time, t^, it is assumed that there are no
supplies or munitions being consumed in defending the area
in which the system is located. The logistic systems of
the zone of interior and of the area of operations will be
considered to be parts of the same system and for this
reason, they are not distinguishable in the model. The
reader is again reminded of the definition of a land logis-
tic system in the sense that there are numerous depots of the
system which are interconnected by a complex of logistic
routes and that there are logistic stockpiles associated
with the depots. The model describes a relationship between
the flows of supplies and munitions in this system.
A schematic diagram of the logistic flows is shown in
Figure 1 for a two depot system. In general, there will be
some larger number of depots, say m all of which are inter-
connected by flows in a manner similar to that of the two-
depot case. In the general case, let us consider the itn
depot. At any particular time, there will be a certain




















as Xj_(t). That part of this flow that is sent to or from
the depot stockpile is denoted by S^, and that part that is




More precise definitions of these quantities appear in the
Table of Symbols. Each of the m depots will have a set of
these flows.
2. The Equations of Flow.
The flows of materiel in the system are related to
each other by a set of m eouations, one equation for each
depot. These equations are of the type:
Xi(t) - ^ xki - Si B 0, i : 1, 2, , m. (2-1)
KU
However, these m equations are subject to certain
structural relationships and restrictions. It is assumed
that the portion of the flow through the itn depot that is
sent to the ktn depot, i.e., the quantity xk ^, is propor-
tional to the flow through the ktn depot. This assumption
is expressed mathematically by eouations of the type:
xki = aki xk(t)> i ^ k, (2-2)
where the coefficients, a^, are constants, and
- a^j_ « 1.
Another fundamental assumption of the model concerns
the flow into or out of the i^" stockpile, the quantity Sj_.




rate of change of the flow of materiel through the depot,
the quantity Xi(t). This assumption gives rise to the addi-
tional structural equations of the type:
•
*
Si = bi X-jJt), i s 1, 2, , m, (2-3)
and in which the coefficients, b^ are constants. Integrat-
ing eauations (2-3) results in the equations:
Si = Si 4- b t Ui(t) - Xi), 1 : 1, 2, , m (2-4)
o o
where the Si and Xi are the initial values of S^ and Xi(t),
i.e., the values of Si and Xi(t) at the time t Q . Equations
(2-4) will give the size of the stockpiles at any time sub-
sequent to time t . These stockpiles will be accumulated
(Si^-O) or decumulated (Si<0) over a period of time depend-
ing on the direction of the flows, Si. -
By invoking the two fundamental assumptions just dis-
cussed, it is possible to restate equations (2-1) as:
Xi(t) - f_ akiXk (t) - biXi(t) = 0, i = 1,2,- -,m
K-i.
K±l (2-5)
Thus far, the flow of materiel over the logistic
routes, x^i(k^i), the size of the stockpiles, Si, and the
flow of materiel through the depots, Xi(t), are described
by the sets of eauations, (2-2), (2-4) and (2-5), respec-




3. Restrictions on the Variables.
The primary variables, x^itk^i), S^, and X-jJt) men-
tioned in the previous section are all subject to certain
constraints consistent with the physical limitations of the
logistic system. Consider first the flow of materiel through
the ith depot, X^(t), which depends on the handling facili-
ties of the depot. This flow can range from zero, in the
case where the depot cannot handle any cargo, to an esti-
A
mated maximum value, X^, the maximum limit of flow of materiel
that the depot is physically capable of handling. At the
time when the system is taken under study, it is assumed
that the system is already functioning and that the initial
o
flow of materiel through the depot at that time is X^ . It
will suffice to say that regardless of the trend that it may
o
subsequently take, Xj_(t) starts at a value X^ and is there-
A
after restricted to values between zero and X^. This condi-
tion is expressed by the inequality:




X^(t ) = X^ = Xi#
In a like manner the amount of materiel in a stockpile,
represented by the variable S^, being dependent on X^(t),
starts at a value, S^, and is restricted to values between
A A
zero and S^, where S^ is the maximum amount of materiel that
can be stored at the i^ depot because of the storage
capacity at that depot. Similarly as before:
11

£ S-5 i S,
(2-7)
where, A
Si(t ) = Si ^ Si
Furthermore, the one-way flow of materiel over the
logistic routes, the quantity xk i (k=£i), will range in
value from zero to a value xk i (k£i), determined by the
maximum one-way route capacity for that particular route,
or:
< < a .
= xki = xki
where, A
xki (t ) = xki = akiXi = xki , k?t i.
These flows are somewhat analogous to the flow of
water through a pipe. For example, Xi(t) could be consi-
dered as the flow of water flowing through the i^" depot
pipe at any particular time. The flow can range from no
A
flow to a maximum flow, Xi, determined by the dimensions
of the pipe.
4. Operation of the Model.
A solution of the equations (2-5) in matrix form is











The variables xki(k^ i) and Si can be found in terms of
theelements, Xi(t), of the matrix |~xl , and thereby illus-
trate the relationships that exist between xki(k^i), Si,
and Xi(t). Due to the reciprocity of the variables in the
model, whenever any one of these variables reaches a
12

limiting value, the effect is reflected throughout the
model to the other variables. In operation, the model may
function in such a manner that the variables remain within
their specified limits at all times. We shall designate
this situation as the unlimited case. As the other alter-
natives, the model may be limited in operation by one of the
primary variables, X^ft), xj^^(k^i), or Sj_ reaching one of
its limits first on a time scale. These occurrences will
be called the depot capacity bound case, the route bound
case, and the stockpile bound case, respectively. These
cases will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV using







A mathematical model was developed in Chapter II which
describes the various logistic flows in an enemy logistic
system for the case where there is no attack in the area of
operations. In this chapter, the model will be modified by
the introduction of additional flows of materiel in the
system assumed to result from an attack on the system.
When an attack is initiated by the opposing forces in the
area of operations at time t^, one or more of the depots
that are regarded as being in the area of operations must
establish additional materiel flows. These flows provide
the materiel which is consumed in defending the environs of
the depots concerned from the attack. Figure 2 shows the
placement of these new flows, xn <, in the schematic flow
diagram of a frontal, depot
.
2. The Demand Functions.
The new flows, xn £, of the frontal depots are the con-
sequences of an attack on these depots by the opposing forces
and will be assumed to be dependent on the magnitude of the
initial assault and the rate of build-up of the attack.
They will be called the demand functions. Let us examine












Figure 2. Schematic Flow Diagram of
T
a Frontal Depot when
Subjected to an Attack
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Since the demand functions are dependent on the magni-
tude of the initial assault, the functions will acquire an
initial value, C<T n ^, at time t^, for each of the depots
assaulted. The manner in which the functions vary after
time t-^ depends on the rate of build-up of the attack. To
describe all of the different variations in the build-up of
the attack is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
typical demand functions are shown graphically in Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) is a graph of a demand function when the demand
caused by the assault reaches immediately a value ^ n i, and
then remains constant throughout the remainder of the attack
Figure 3(b) shows the graph for the case where there is a
linear build-up of demands beginning with the initial
assault, and Figure 3(c) is for the case where there is an
accelerating build-up. The mathematical forms of demand
functions with these characteristics are:
xni = & ni ^ a constant),
xni = <*ni+ nni(t-t].) f (3-D
and xni = ex: n i e^
ni ' t-t l'
,
respectively.
3. The Modified Model.
To modify the mathematical model of Chapter II, we need
only to insert the demand functions and note that values of
the variables of the previous model at time t, are not the
initial values of those same variables under the new regime.







Figure 3. Typical Forms of Demand Functions
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trend as it had previously, but will start at some new
value, Xj[(t]_), and may follow an entirely different trend
after time t-j_. The demand functions, x ^, whatever their
form may be, are introduced in the m equations (2-5) to
give the modified model:
Xi(t) - J_ akiXk (t) - bi Xt = xn ., i z 1, 2, ,m.
K±i (3-2)
All of the other structural equations and restrictions
remain as before (Chapter II), except for their initial
values.
4. Forms of the New Solutions.
The form of the solution of the m eauations (3-2)
depends in part on the form of the demand functions, xn^.
For the case of constant demand functions, the form of the
solution (Appendix A) in matrix notation is:
[x] .e^M (t -tl! {[X(tl)] -[Mj-^xjj+M- 1 [xj (3-3)
For the case of variable demand functions which do not remain
constant with time, a general form of the solution in matrix
notation is
Bre*
1-1 [M] ,t -tl, [Kt 1 )]+ e
&1_1M ^e-M'H^wdt.
'1 (3-4)
At this point we have a model which describes the logis-
tic flows in an enemy logistic system while an attack by the
opposing forces is taking place in the area of operations.
Chapter IV consists of a discussion of the interdictory con-








The general topics discussed in this chapter are cer-
tain aspects of interdicting an enemy logistic system based
on the modified logistic model of Chapter III. The modified
model was developed in Chapter III to describe the logistic
flows in an enemy logistic system commencing at the time of
the assault initiated by the attacking forces in the area
of operations, the time of the attack being denoted by t^.
The different trends that any particular flow might take
with respect to time after time t-^ depends largely on the
demand functions. It is not possible in this paper to show
graphically all of the trends that any one variable might
take. However, some representative trends are shown graphi-
cally in Figure 4(a), (b) and (c), for the primary variables
X^(t), S^_, and a typical x^^(k^i), respectively, for the
ith depot.
It has been indicated previously (Chapter II) that we
can expect to deal with one of four cases, the unlimited
case, the depot capacity bound case, the logistic route
bound case, or the stockpile limited case. Briefly, let us






x i (t 1 )
S i(t!)
(c) xkl (t x )
Figure 4. Several Representative Trends of the Variables
Xjjt), S^, and Xj., with Respect to Time.
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variables reaches a limiting value. Suppose that X^(t) for
the i un depot reaches its limiting value, X^, at some time,
say t f
,
later than tj_, and suppose that this is the first
variable to reach a limiting value. This depot capacity
bound case is shown in Figure 5(a). The input or output
flow to the stockpile of that depot, the quantity S.
,
will
become zero at time t f and the stockpile size, Sj, will
become static. This condition is depicted in Figure 5(b).
Furthermore, all logistic route input flows from other
depots to this particular depot will become static. This
effect is shown in Figure 5(c) for a typical logistic route
input flow.
Due to the reciprocity inherent in the model, this
seauence of events will affect the other flows in the model,
and one or more of these flows yill instantly assume new
values to compensate for this effect. The model may con-
tinue to function normally after these events or the effect
may cause. one or more of the other variables to reach its
limiting value at that time or at a later time. This chain
reaction may cause the flows to cascade to their respective
limits which may result in ultimate failure of the system
to keep pace with the demand functions. It is conceivable
that the process may occur at time 1 1]_, but as far as this
discussion is concerned, it is assumed that the process













x ij (t l }
(a)
Figure 5. Curves Showing a Typical Depot Capacity Bound
Case for the ith Depot
22

in this limiting process are useful in understanding the
interdiction methods to be described later in this chapter.
2. The Interdictory Objective.
In this paper, the primary objective of the attacking
commanders interdiction program will be regarded as an
attempt to reduce the flows of materiel in the enemy 1 s
logistic system by interdiction to such levels that the
system will be confined to producing reduced demands. It
will be assumed that interdiction will commence at the time
of the attack, time tj. The reduced demands may be repre-
sented in the modified model by reduced values of the demand
function. The reduced values of the demand functions are
denoted by x^ (i = 1, 2, - -«-, m), and are defined by the
equations:
xni = Pnixni » i = X » 2 » • m .. _.(4-1/
where § Pn i < 1.
The reduced values of the demand functions are selected
by the attacking commander at his discretion. He should
select a value for any particular x*^ such that the enemy
forces which would normally rely on the materiel flow x^,
cannot effectively defend themselves with the reduced
materiel flow x . . The amount by which the materiel flows
ni J
xn j_ are reduced is denoted by Rn i» It follows that:
Rn i = xni " x*i {4
~ 2)
and
Rni = [^ni] xni> i x 1, 2, , m (4-3)
23

3. The Interdiction Methods.
If the flows xn ^ are to be reduced by Rn i, then the
other flows in the system must also be reduced in order to
preserve the equality of eauations (3-2). Let the flows X^
be reduced by the amounts R [x^(tj 1
,
such that the m eaua-
tions (3-2) can be expressed in terms of the reduced flows
as:
JXi-R [X± {tj\\ - £ ak . ixk-R[xk (t)]j -bijXi-R^tjjj









± = Xi - R [X i (t)J (4-6)
*ki = aki< -aki {xk -R [Xk (t)]j (4-7)
S* r biX* = bi | Xi - R [Xjjt)]) U-S)
By subtracting equations (4-4) from eauations (3-2), we
obtain the m eauations
R
[
Xi (t)j - £ aki R [Xk (6)]- b t R [xt (t)] : R fii
K*t (4-9)
These equations can be solved in terms of the quantities Rn ^
in the same manner as the equations (3-2), and the solution
results in the determination of:
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R [Xi(t)] , (4-10)
R [xki (t)] = aki R [Xk (t)] , k^ i , (4-11)
and . . -.
R [Si(t)J = b t R [X ± {t)] m (4-12)
From the last equations, (4-12), we may derive:
R [Si(t)J = R [s^t^-H b ± ^R [li(t)j - R [xi (t 1 )]|
(4-13)
The attacking commander has the options of interdicting
the materiel in the system, the handling facilties of the
system, or both. Figures 6, 7 and S show graphically
typical curves of reduced flows through a depot and in a
logistic route, and the amount of reduced materiel in a
stockpile, respectively. Consider the reduced flow through
the depot (Figure 6). Should the attacking commander elect
to interdict the flow of materiel passing through the depot,
at time t-^ his interdicting forces should reduce this flow
by the amount R [X^(tQ_)J by destroying materiel as it
transits the depot. On the other hand, if he elects to
destroy the handling facilities of this depot in order to
reduce the flow of materiel through the depot, his inter-
dicting forces should destroy enough of the facilities such
A
that the maximum possible flow of materiel, X^,* will be
reduced to a level X.(t^)(= X^(t^)). It may be seen in
Figure 6 that:
A —
0(t ± ) = Xi - Xi (t i )
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and X ± (t)
R [xi (tV
Figure 6. Typical Curve Showing the Reduced Flow of






*.(t) and xki (t)
Figure 7. Typical Curves Showing the Reduced Flow of
Materiel that is Sent from Depot (i) to Depot




R [S i (t 1 )
S.(t) and S^^lt)
^(t)
Figure 8. Typical Curves Showing the Reduced Stockpile
Size at the ith Depot (Stockpile Accumulating).
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As time progresses additional materiel transits the
depot and the enemy rebuilds his damaged handling facilities.
These facts indicate that additional interdiction is required
overtime, and these conditions are depicted in Figure 6.
Thus it may be deduced that the attacking commander should
maintain an interdiction schedule for that depot such that
the conditions required by one of the following eouations
are valid for all t, either: .
X*(t) = X± (t) - R [Xi(t)J , (4-15)
or
Xi(t) = X*(t) = X t - 0i(t) (4-16)
depending on whether he elects to interdict the materiel
transiting the depot or the handling facilities of the
depot. A similar analysis applies for the flows of materiel
over the logistic routes and the materiel stored in the




xki (t) = xki (t) - R [xki (t)J , k* i, (4-17)
xki (t) z xki (t) = xki - \|/ ki (t), kf i, (4-1S)
Sj(t) = Si(t) - R [Si(t)J , (4-19)
S i (t) = S i (t) = Si - Oi(t) (4-20)
This type of analysis would apply to all components of the
enemy's logistic system as well.
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4. The Magnitude of the Problem.
The interdiction methods analyzed in the previous
section are for an ideal situation and there is no assur-
ance that the interdiction objective can be attained. In
the first place, 1 the attacking commander may not have suf-
ficient interdictory forces available to be capable of
maintaining the magnitude of interdiction effort required.
It is possible that the initial effort expended may pre-
clude winning the campaign, which in turn, may impair the
success of the strategic war. Furthermore, as soon as the
attacking commander interdicts the enemy's logistic system,
and regardless of where the system was interdicted, the
enemy can readjust certain flows in the system to compensate
for the interdiction effects and in accord with any policy
that he might exercise. For example, the enemy's policy
at any particular depot may be to' supnort his forces in the
field by arbitrarily decumulating an accumulating stock-
pile or it may be to continue building this stockpile at
the expense of his forces in the field. There are numerous
other options which he may choose. In any case, these
effects are produced by changing the constants a^(k^i)
and bi in the model. Since the attacking commander usually
has sparse information on these policies, he must re-examine
the flows of materiel in the enemy's system between each
interdictory effort. These observations indicate a possi-
ble application of game theory to the problem.
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The author hopes that this approach to the interdic-
tion problem has clarified some of the problems which con-
front the military commander in planning interdiction
problems, and that it will provide him with an implement
which he can utilize in planning interdiction campaigns.
Chapter V contains a brief discussion of the use of analog
computers to calculate certain mathematical Quantities of




THE USE OF ANALOG COMPUTERS
1. General Discussion.
In solving the systems of equations (2-5) and (3-2)
to obtain explicit mathematical solutions, equations (2-9)
and (3-4), respectively, it is necessary to perform a matrix
inversion, cf. Appendix A. The magnitude of this task is
considerable if the number of depots, m, is large, Fur-
thermore, the plotting of the curves, such as those shown
in Figure 6, becomes a tedious task for a large number of
variables. Much of this work can be avoided by the use of
a large-scale analog computer. Such a computer will accept
equations (2-5) or (3-2) if one of the equations in a system
is expressed in terms of the others. The computer will
solve this equation and if a plotter is attached, the plot-
ter will plot the curves for all of the variables desired
as a function of time.
The use of analog computing equipment and auxiliary
plotters represents a tremendous saving of effort over
>
manual methods of matrix inversion and plotting. It is
envisioned in proposing the methods of this paper for plan-
ning interdiction campaigns that such equipment would be




Departments of the Army,






Frazer, R.A., Duncan, W.J.
and Collar, A.R.
OPNAVINST 3020-1A, Dictionary
of United States Military



















Proceedings of a Conference,
Activity Analysis of Produc-
tion and Allocation. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., N.Y.1951.
Economic Activity Analysis,
John Wiley &. Sons, Inc., N.Y.
1954.
Elementary Matrices, The Uni-




SOLUTIONS OF CERTAIN SYSTEMS
OF
DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS
1. A System of Simple First-Order Form.
In this section we are concerned with the solution of
the equations (2-5), namely, the system of m eauations of
the type:
rn
(A-l)x i " X akiXk - b ±X± =
These equations may be stated in matrix form in the fol-
lowing manner:








A = a2 i a31
a 12 a-l32
L13 a23














X - B^MX = 0,
It follows that:
X - AX - BX = [i - a] X - BX =
Setting M = I - A, we have:
MX - BX = 0,
and
or,
X + CX = 0, where C = - B~ XM. ( A-3
)
The system of equations (A-3) is similar to the single
differential equation:
f + cf - 0, (A-4)
which has a solution of the form:
f(t) = e^^o) f(t ). (A-5)
Equations (A-3) will have the same form of solution as
equation (A-4) which results in:
X = e
- c ( t - t o)x°, (A-6)
where:
C = -B^M, and X° = X x (t )
x2 (t )
In order to calculate the matrix e~ (-'' t " t o)
we define:
a. The characteristic matrix of C, namely,
f(\ ) . -XI . c.
b. The adjoint matrix of f ( *X ) , designated by F( "X ) .








If the characteristic roots of the matrix C are all
distinct, then e'^'^'^o' is found by the formula:




= ) 7J7TTZ—, ' (A-7)
\r = l
^ ( \ r )
where,
^^)^\rAM^h-\
When the characteristic roots of the matrix C are not all










2. Solution of the Equations for the Modified Model.
The m equation (3-2) of the type,
m
i " X akiXk " b i x i = xni> (A-9)
KM
K*t
can be expressed in matrix form similarly to equations
(A-l), i.e.,
X + CX : D, (A-10)









The solution of equations (A-10) consists of a comple-






""^ t ~ t l^ X(ti) (complementary solution) (A-ll)
and
X = e~ct | e
ct D dt, (particular integral) (A-12)
The full solution is the sum of the complementary solution
and the particular integral, or:
x s e







If the matrix' D consists of constant elements, then
the solution (A-13) may be evaluated as:
x.,-C(t-t 1 )x(ti) + | I.--c(t-t 1 >] [ M-ix ] t (A _U)
which is the same as equation (3-3) in the text when the
terms are rearranged to give:
X = e"
C(t " t l ) [x(t
1 )
-M" 1x]+ M^x,
where the matrix C - - B^M. The evaluation of the exponen-
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